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Abstract
This paper studies a dynamic version of the Holmstrom-Tirole model of intermedi-
ated finance. I show that competitive equilibria are not constrained efficient when
the economy experiences a financial crises. A pecuniary externality entails that bank
back-loading of dividend payments may weaken bank incentives. Banks’ strong de-
sire to accumulate capital over time aggravates the scarcity of informed capital during
the financial crisis. I show that a constrained social planner finds it beneficial to in-
troduce a permanent wedge between the deposit rate and the economy’s marginal
rate of transformation. The wedge improves borrowers’ access to finance during a
financial crisis by strengthening banks’ incentives to provide intermediation services.
I propose a simple implementation of the constrained-efficient allocation that limits
bank size.
1 Introduction
Financial crises can lead to considerable welfare costs for entire countries or even groups
of countries. Various authors show how to limit thee occurrence and cost of financial
crises.2 However, policy makers understand that severe financial crises can still occur and
1This work greatly benefited from discussions with Andrew Atkeson, Piero Gottardi, Hugo Hopenhayn,
Mark Wright, and especially Christian Hellwig and Pierre-Olivier Weill. I am grateful to Arpad Abraham,
Christian Bayer, Elena Carletti, Russell Cooper, David Levine, Gernot Mueller, Ed Nosal, Anjan Thakor, Jean
Tirole, and Venky Venkateswaran for helpful comments and suggestions. All errors are mine. For an up-to-
date version please visit https://sites.google.com/site/josefschroth/.
2See Kashyap, Rajan, and Stein (2008) for a proposal of how banks should insure against large shocks,
which opens the recent discussion about "bail-ins" and contingent debt. See Lorenzoni (2008), Jeanne and
Korinek (2010), and Gersbach and Rochet (2011) for a discussion of ex-ante "macro-prudential" regulation to
limit the severity of crises.
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may wish to explore their role in crisis resolution. There is relatively little theoretical
research characterizing how an optimal regulatory response (if any) to a financial crisis
might look like. When bank capital is reduced during a crisis, banks experience a decrease
in their access to outside finance and respond by reducing lending to borrowers which
will then forego profitable investment opportunities.3 Such a credit crunch is the result of
optimal decision making by banks and bank creditors that are wary of restricted liquidity
of bank loans. To assess the need for a regulatory intervention we need to understand how
privately optimal decisions can lead to socially inefficient outcomes. In this paper, I address
this question by focussing on a pecuniary externality which arises from the combination
of financial constraints and a competitive market for bank lending. I analyze constrained
efficiency by considering a planner who faces the same constraints faced by banks and
bank creditors, and asking whether a change in bank lending policy can lead to a Pareto
improvement. My main result is that banks grow too large in equilibrium eventually, which
negatively affects their ability to supply funds to borrowers during a credit crunch.
The paper develops a model of an infinite horizon production economy. Firms produce
and have the ability to misappropriate cash flows. Banks can prevent firm theft but cannot
commit to do so. This makes bank loans illiquid and is the reason for the financial fric-
tion in the economy. Bank creditors thus demand that deposits be secured by bank loans
as well as bank equity. Banks can be shut down such that in equilibrium bank creditors
will accept a higher bank loan-to-equity ratio when bank future profits are higher. During
a credit crunch, banks are profitable as they are collecting a rent on scarce bank equity.
Each bank will maximize its net present value by retaining profits and accumulating equity
over time. Banks will only start paying dividends when the economy reaches an uncon-
strained steady state at which bank rents are zero. Banks understand that deferring the
distribution of equity has the direct effect of increasing profits, and thus leverage during
the credit crunch. However, banks (and bank creditors) do not internalize that excessive
back-loading of dividend payments drives bank rents to zero eventually, which in turn
reduces bank leverage during a credit crunch. The pecuniary externality arises from exces-
sive bank lending in steady state which reduces bank incentives to monitor firms during a
credit crunch. A social planner will require banks to start paying out equity as dividends
before bank rents drop to zero. The planner thus guarantees strictly positive bank rents
by limiting the size of banks. By reducing future aggregate bank lending a planner can
strengthen bank incentives and thus increase bank leverage during a credit crunch. Intu-
3See Ivashina and Scharfstein (2010) and Campello, Graham, and Harvey (2010) for some evidence that
this narrative may have characterized the 2007-2009 US financial crisis.
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itively, a small distortionary future rent for banks leads to a welfare loss that is of a second
order compared to the first-order welfare gain from increased bank lending in all preceding
periods. The planner back-loads distortionary rents in the same way as banks back-load
dividend payments.4 Figure 1 illustrates how the constrained-efficient allocation differs
from the laissez-faire competitive equilibrium.
Figure 1: The blue line shows bank lending over time in competitive equilibrium. Banks accumulate
equity until some unconstrained steady state is reached. In contrast, the green line shows bank
lending as prescribed by a social planner. Banks are required to pay out equity before rents drop
to zero. This guarantees bank future profits by keeping bank equity scarce and strengthens bank
incentives initially. Bank leverage and lending increases initially - a social planner smoothes out the
scarcity of bank lending over time.
Much research focuses on how banks react to external shocks. Take, for example, the
case of a sudden increase in bank competition in the US around 1980. Keeley (1990) finds
that banks with lower future profits (as implied by a markup of market to book asset values)
seem to have been more likely to try to exploit the deposit insurance scheme.5 In my model
any insurance scheme would be fairly priced such that a reduction in future profits leads
to a reduction in bank lending rather than increased bank moral hazard. Future profits
are thus positively correlated with bank leverage in the model, while Keeley (1990) finds a
negative correlation. Specifically, I ignore the possibility of bank moral hazard at the point
4Suppose it would not be possible to shut down the bank such that the financial friction manifests itself as
a collateral constraint rather than an individual rationality constraint. Then a planner would see no benefit
from guaranteeing future rents to banks.
5Marcus (1984) also formalizes the relationship between charter value and bank moral hazard, as do many
subsequent papers in the banking literature. See Bhattacharya, Boot, and Thakor (1998) for an overview.
In this paper, I derive the need for a regulatory intervention from inefficiency of decentralized contracting
between banks and their creditors.
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in time where banks are impacted by the exogenous unexpected shock. The important
point is that bank future profits are positively related to bank incentives not to engage in
moral hazard. As another example, take the account of a sudden decrease in bank equity
presented in Peek and Rosengren (2000a). They show how a decrease in the equity of
Japanese banks due to a drop in Japanese assets held by these banks caused those banks to
reduce lending to the US real estate sector. Due to the segmentation of real estate markets
they are able to show that the negative shock to bank loan supply had significant economic
consequences. In the paper, I model the effect of bank future profits and bank equity on
bank lending and economic activity.
Following Kiyotaki and Moore (1997), much theoretical research on financial regulation
has been employing rich models suitable for quantitative analysis. This paper focuses on
a particular financial friction and derives an optimal regulatory response in a framework
where agents, rather than facing a set of ad-hoc constraints on financial transactions, enter
in private contracts freely. More recent research explores rich models with a stronger em-
phasis on motivating financial frictions. For example, my results are applicable in the setup
developed in Gertler and Kiyotaki (2010) where debt constraints depend on future prices.
This paper builds on the insight developed in Kehoe and Levine (1993) that private
contracts may lead to equilibrium prices which cannot support all potential gains from
trade. Closely related is work by Kehoe and Perri (2004) and Abraham and Carceles-
Poveda (2006) who study corrective taxation or quantity restrictions in economies where the
usual second welfare theorem fails. In these papers, the aggregate capital stock positively
affects the value of a default such that an aggregate welfare measure can be increased by
limiting capital accumulation. This paper studies the case where the aggregate capital stock
negatively affects the value of staying in the contract, and where optimal regulation yields
a Pareto improvement by limiting capital accumulation. Moreover, if the planner distorts
the capital stock in a given period it will increase the value of staying in the contract in
all preceding periods. In that sense, the planner chooses to back-load distorting the capital
stock.6 To do so, the planner must effectively restrict the agent’s desire for back-loading.
Specifically, banks will not be allowed to accumulate equity beyond a certain threshold in
order to limit future bank lending.
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2, I introduce the model. In section 3,
I characterize the competitive equilibrium. In section 4, I characterize the constrained-
efficient allocation and discuss policy implications. Section 5 concludes.
6In Abraham and Carceles-Poveda (2006) future prices enter incentive constraints as well but it is not clear
whether a constrained social planner would want to distort them.
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2 Model
Time is discrete and infinite with periods t = 0, 1, 2, . . . There is a measure one of iden-
tical workers and a measure one of identical banks. There are three goods: a perishable
consumption good, physical capital, and labor. The consumption good can be turned into
physical capital instantaneously and costlessly, and vice versa.
Workers are risk neutral and have preferences over non-negative consumption plans
c = fctgt=0,1,2,... represented by
U(c) =
¥
å
t=0
btct, (1)
where b 2 (0, 1) is the subjective discount factor of both workers and banks. Workers each
receive an endowment w0 > 0 of the consumption in period t = 0 and an endowment of
one unit of labor in periods t = 1, 2, . . . Banks are risk neutral and have preferences over
non-negative dividend plans d = fdtgt=0,1,2,... represented by
V(d) =
¥
å
t=0
btdt. (2)
Banks each have an endowment a0 > 0 of the consumption good at t = 0, and have access
to a monitoring technology in each period t = 1, 2, . . . .
Each worker owns a firm, such that there is a measure one of identical firms as well. At
each t = 0, 1, 2, . . . , the firm borrows k f ,t+1 units of the consumption good and turns it into
physical capital. In period t+ 1, the firm hires l f ,t+1 units of labor, produces
F(k f ,t+1, l f ,t+1) = kaf ,t+1l
1 a
f ,t+1 (3)
units of the consumption good and also retains (1  d)k f ,t+1 units of undepreciated capital,
with a 2 (0, 1) and d 2 (0, 1]. Without loss of generality we can assume that firms borrow
from banks at interest rate Rt+1, and hire labor on a competitive labor market at wage rate
wt+1. It is assumed that each firm borrows from any one bank in a given period. At the
end of period t+ 1, the worker receives firm profits of
pt+1 = kaf ,t+1l
1 a
f ,t+1 + (1  d)k f ,t+1   Rt+1k f ,t+1   wt+1l f ,t+1. (4)
Assumption 1. A firm loses fraction q 2 (0, a] of production unless it is monitored by a bank.
The crucial assumption is that a worker cannot run its own firm and relies on a bank to
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monitor it. Assumption 1 also ensures that, in equilibrium, a firm has sufficient cash flows
to pay workers even when it is not monitored.
Definition 1. In an unconstrained First Best, where productive efficiency is not affected by assump-
tion 1, aggregate physical capital employed by firms is given by
k f ,t+1 = KFB =

ab
1  b(1  d)
 1
1 a
for all t = 0, 1, 2, . . . . (5)
2.1 Financial contracts and limited commitment
Banks use internal funds (equity) and external funds (debt) to finance loans to firms. At
date zero, banks offer financial contracts to workers. These contracts specify a sequence of
promised payments from banks to workers, or bank debt levels, fbtgt=0,1,2,..., with b0 = 0.7
A bank can keep its promise in period t by making a partial repayment xt to the worker or
by issuing a new promise bt+1. The repayment xt may be negative, in which case a bank
becomes more indebted to the worker.
It is assumed that a worker’s initial endowment w0 is large enough to guarantee that
worker consumption c is strictly positive.8 Then the following two conditions need to be
satisfied if workers are willing to roll over debt.
xt + bbt+1  bt, t = 0, 1, 2, . . . (6)
¥
å
t=0
btxt  0 (7)
Condition (6) can be interpreted as a promise keeping constraint while condition (7) is the
worker’s participation constraint. Banks will only offer contracts such that (6) and (7) hold
with equality. Then (7) can be written as a transversality condition for the bank,
lim
t!¥ b
tbt = 0. (8)
In period zero, the bank uses initial equity a0 and payment x0 < 0 to finance dividends
and lending to firms,
d0 + k1 + x0  a0.
7b0 < 0 would violate worker participation while b0 > 0 is clearly not optimal for the bank.
8A sufficient condition is w0  KFB   a0 and 1  a > (1  d)b
h
ab1  1a + 1  2a
i
.
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In periods t = 1, 2, . . . , the bank faces budget constraints of the form
dt + kt+1 + xt  Rtkt.
For t = 0, 1, 2, . . . , let at+1 = Rt+1kt+1   bt+1 denote beginning of period t+ 1 bank equity
then, with (6) binding, bank budget constraints can be written as
dt + kt+1  at + bbt+1. (9)
The financial contract characterized by fbt+1, dtgt=0,1,2,... is subject to limited commit-
ment of banks. If the bank defaults on the contract in t its assets (outstanding loans to the
firm) will be seized by the worker and it will be excluded from future lending to firms.
However, the worker will only be able to collect partially on outstanding loans. It is as-
sumed the bank can make a take-it-or-leave-it offer at that point. The bank can thus obtain
a payment from the worker in exchange for monitoring the firm and making full loan col-
lection possible for the worker. Let Qt be the payment, per unit of the loan, that the bank
can obtain from the worker during a bank default. Then the condition that prevents bank
default is given by
Vt(d) 
¥
å
s=0
bsdt+s  Qtkt. (10)
Condition (10) differs from a collateral constraint in that the bank is allowed to make a take-
it-or-leave-it-offer only after it has been excluded from future lending activity.9 Without
loss of generality I can restrict attention to financial contracts that are renegotiation-proof,
which is the case whenever the no-default condition (10) holds.
2.2 Individual decision problems and definition of competitive equilib-
rium
The bank offers a contract fbt+1, dtgt=0,1,2,... to a worker and chooses a firm lending pol-
icy fkt+1gt=0,1,2,... to maximize bank value (2) subject to worker participation (8), bank
budget balance (9), bank no-default condition (10), and dividend non-negativity. The
worker decides whether to accept the contract and consumes income, yielding value of
U(c) = w0 + å¥t=1 b
t(wt + pt). Firms choose a profit-maximizing input plan. Prices
9To be more precise, the bank loses its ability to monitor firms in t+ 1, t+ 2, . . . if it defaults in period t.
This does not depend on how long a bank lends to the same firm. Another way to arrive at (10) would be
to assume bank moral hazard in the form of diverting firm cash flow or enjoying a private benefit from not
monitoring as in Holmstrom and Tirole (1997).
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fwt,Rtgt=1,2,... are taken as given by all agents.
Definition 2. A competitive equilibrium is given by a financial contract fbt+1, dtgt=0,1,2,..., a bank
lending policy fkt+1gt=0,1,2,..., a worker consumption plan fctgt=0,1,2,..., and a firm input plan
fk f ,t+1, l f ,t+1gt=0,1,2,... such that, given prices fwt,Rtgt=1,2,... and endowments fa0,w0g (i) the
respective decision problems are solved, (ii) markets for bank loans and labor clear.
3 Competitive equilibrium
This section characterizes the competitive equilibrium. Workers will take a passive role as
long as their participation constraint (8) holds. Firms will take a passive role as long as
prices are as given in lemma 1. The lemma also shows that the bank default value depends
on aggregate bank lending. Intuitively, the bank can decide how much to lend to a firm
but a firm’s demand for bank loans is determined in equilibrium.10
Lemma 1. Let Kt denote aggregate bank lending to firms in period t = 1, 2, . . . ,
(i) A firm will demand bank loans k f ,t = Kt and labor l f ,t = 1 whenever
Rt = aKa 1t + 1  d,
wt = (1  a)Kat .
Further, firm profits are zero, pt = 0 for all t = 1, 2, . . .
(ii) The bank default value is given by Qt = qKa 1t per unit of the loan.
To complete the characterization of the competitive equilibrium it is necessary to find the
optimal financial contract. It can be found as the solution to the following bank problem.
max
fkt+1,bt+1,dtgt=0,1,2,...
¥
å
t=0
btdt
10Alternatively, we could assume firms could lose fraction q of their borrowed capital rather than produc-
tion, such that Qt = q for all t = 1, 2, . . . . Only the quantitative properties of the model (briefly explored in
section 4) would change.
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subject to
kt+1 + dt = bbt+1 + at,
at+1 = Rt+1kt+1   bt+1,
Vt+1 =
¥
å
t=t+1
bt t 1dt  Qt+1kt+1,
dt  0, lim
t!¥ b
tbt+t = 0,
for t = 0, 1, 2, . . . , where initial equity a0 2 R++ is given. Note that 1b can be interpreted as
the bank’s deposit rate and that it also equals the bank’s discount rate. The problem takes
a familiar form and has a straightforward solution that is stated in proposition 1.11
Proposition 1. A competitive equilibrium is characterized by a cutoff a¯0 = bqKaFB such that for
t = 0, 1, 2, . . .
(i) if at  a¯0, then bank lending is equal to KFB and remains at that level thereafter,
(ii) if at < a¯0, then there is a T  1 such that bank lending grows at rate g = b  1a for T   1
periods and is equal to KFB thereafter.
As long as aggregate bank lending is below KFB, the bank prefers to increase its debt.
The reason is that it wishes to exploit the arbitrage opportunity Rt+1   1b > 0. Since any
financial contract satisfies the bank no-default condition bank leverage is constrained. The
bank then finds it optimal to retain earnings to maximize equity available for lending to the
firm. When equity is high enough, at  a¯0, such that bank leverage is no longer constrained
by the bank no-default condition then Kt+1 = KFB and bank profits are zero.12 The blue
line in figure 1 illustrates the transition that results from an initial scarcity of bank equity,
a0 < a¯0.
A less familiar feature of the competitive equilibrium is that bank future profits gener-
11This is very similar to, for example, the dynamics described in Albuquerque and Hopenhayn (2004).
12Recall that we could assume the worker provides finance to the firm and pays the bank for its monitoring
service. Then the financial contract would not prescribe bank debt but rather payments to the bank in
exchange for its monitoring service. Low bank equity then implies that banks cannot commit to monitor firm
investment of size KFB. The bank’s monitoring service can then command a premium, i.e. the payments are
strictly positive (bank’s monitoring cost is zero). The bank’s profit Rt   1b > 0 per unit of firm investment
monitored does not come from the bank’s access to firms per se, but rather from the scarcity of bank equity.
See Holmstrom and Tirole (1997) for a further discussion.
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ally decrease as bank equity increases.13 Bank future profits at date t are given by
Pt =
¥
å
s=1
bs

Rt+s   1
b

kt+s. (11)
The level of bank lending that a monopolistic bank would choose is given by
KM =

a2b
1  b(1  d)
 1
1 a
< KFB.
From proposition 1 and lemma 1 we see that Pt decreases monotonically for Kt  KM
and reaches zero after finitely many periods. To see how this affects the bank’s incentive
to default, note that the bank’s value in t = 1, 2, . . . can be expressed as Vt = at +Pt by
summing over (9) and using (8). Then the bank no-default condition can be written as
at +Pt  Qtkt. (12)
A bank back-loads dividend payments in order to accumulate equity and relax (12) by
increasing the first term on the lefthand side.14 In equilibrium, however, the fact that
all banks engage in such back-loading implies that each bank’s no-default condition (12)
actually may become tighter due to a decrease in bank lending returns, i.e. a decrease of
the second term on the lefthand side. In other words, the bank’s private return on equity
exceeds the social return on equity. This is the pecuniary externality that I focus on in the
paper.
4 Constrained-efficient allocation
Consider a social planner that can choose a financial contract fbt+1, dtgt=0,1,2,.... The planner
is constrained in the sense that it faces the same constraints as the bank, in particular,
it must offer a contract that satisfies the bank’s no-default condition and the worker’s
participation condition.15 A constrained-efficient financial contract maximizes joint welfare
13For example, in Albuquerque and Hopenhayn (2004) size and profits move in the same direction.
14To be precise, the bank internalizes that higher bank equity also increases Pt directly by allowing for
higher lending to firms. Future profits can be written as the inner product Pt = Qt+1  k, where k =
fk1, k2, k3, . . . g is the bank lending plan and where Qt+1 = f0, . . . , 0, b(Rt+1   1/b), b2(Rt+2   1/b), . . . g
with the first t entries zero is takes as given by the bank. Note that k 2 l¥ and Qt+1 is an element of the dual
space l¥ for all t = 0, 1, 2, . . . such that Pt is bounded. However, this direct positive effect is dominated by
the negative indirect effect via the decrease of return on bank loans for Kt  KM.
15With scarce bank equity an initial transfer from worker to the bank (setting b0 < 0) would increase joint
welfare. However, the planner is constrained by the worker participation requirement (7).
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of banks and workers, taking into consideration the effect of the bank lending policy on the
return on bank lending, worker labor income and bank default values.
Definition 3. A constrained-efficient allocation is given by a financial contract fbt+1, dtgt=0,1,2,...,
with associated bank lending, fkt+1gt=0,1,2,... that maximizes joint welfare given by
W0 
¥
å
t=0
btdt +
¥
å
t=0
btct = d0 + w0 +
¥
å
t=1
bt [dt + (1  a)kat ]
subject to
kt+1 + dt = bbt+1 + at,
at+1 =
h
aka 1t+1 + 1  d
i
kt+1   bt+1,
Vt+1 =
¥
å
t=t+1
bt t 1dt  qkat+1,
dt  0, lim
t!¥ b
tbt+t = 0,
with a0 and w0 given.
When initial bank equity is low, a0 < a¯0, then bank lending is below its unconstrained
First Best level KFB such that output, and in particular workers’ wages, are constrained.
We expect the planner to choose a financial contract that features back-loading similar to
the contract that arises in competitive equilibrium. Bank lending will increase as long as
banks accumulate equity. However, the planner internalizes the pecuniary externality and
will require banks to pay out equity as dividends before aggregate bank lending reaches
KFB. To see this, suppose we have kt = KFB in some period t. Then a marginal reduction
in bank lending kt results in a redistribution from workers to banks. Since bank lending is
at the unconstrained First Best and since the social value of banks’ internal funds (weakly)
exceeds that of workers it follows that joint welfare at t does not decrease. But since the
redistribution to banks increases bank value at t it also increases bank value at 1, 2, . . . , t  1.
This relaxes banks’ no-default constraints and enables the planner to increase bank lending
at 1, 2, . . . , t  1. Since bank lending was scarce in t = 1 joint welfare strictly increases at
date zero. When the planner distorts the steady state this will result in a distortionary cost
that is of second order compared to the first-order gain of increased bank lending initially.
The planner back-loads distortionary bank rents but that implies it must limit banks’ back-
loading of equity distributions. This is summarized in proposition 2. Lemma 2 verifies that
banks and workers are better off under the constrained-efficient allocation.
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Proposition 2. If a0 < a¯0 then the constrained-efficient allocation is characterized by numbers
K 2 (KM,KFB) and T  1 such that
(i) kt  K < KFB at all times t = 1, 2, . . . , where k1 higher than first-period bank lending in
competitive equilibrium,
(ii) bank lending grows at rate g = b  1a for T   1 periods and is equal to K thereafter.
Lemma 2. A constrained-efficient allocation is a Pareto improvement relative to the competitive
equilibrium.
Proposition 2 clearly shows how a planner can improve on the competitive equilibrium.
By reducing steady state bank lending the planner is able to fast-forward the recovery from
the initial scarcity of bank equity. This is illustrated by the green line in figure 1
4.1 Implementing the constrained-efficient allocation
The above analysis shows that banks in competitive equilibrium accumulate bank equity
beyond the point where it is socially beneficial. Excessive back-loading by banks enables
them to supply an inefficiently high amount of loans to firms in steady state but reduces
the amount of loans that can be supplied early on (during the credit crunch). We know
from proposition 2 that a planner rather prefers a smooth out bank lending over time.
Proposition 3 shows how to decentralize the constrained-efficient allocation as a competi-
tive equilibrium with an upper bound on bank size as measured by equity.
Proposition 3. The constrained-efficient allocation can be decentralized as a competitive equilibrium
where the size of banks, as measured by bank equity, is constrained. The upper bound on bank equity
is given by
A = qKa  P,
where
K =
 
a
1
b(1 t0)   1+ d
! 1
1 a
, P = 1
1  b
t0
1  t0K
,
t0 = k0
1  b(1  d)
1  k0b(1  d) , k0 = (1  a)

1  1
l0

,
and where l0 =
dW0
da0
 1 is date zero social return on bank equity. When a0 < bqKaFB, then l0 > 1
and t0 > 0.
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It is important to see that the theory developed here concerns a pecuniary externality
affecting incentives. Suppose a version of the model where banks cannot be excluded
from earning future profits when engaging in moral hazard. A planner will then see no
benefit from distorting steady state bank lending, and has in fact no tools to improve
upon the competitive equilibrium. From this we can derive an interesting implication for
institutional design. Suppose a planner has political capital to spend on alleviating the
bank moral hazard problem directly (lowering q) or indirectly (more effectively exclude
banks upon moral hazard). While the first measure reduces the cost of financial crises, the
second measure also increases the potency of optimal financial crisis resolution. Unless q
can be driven to zero the second measure should be given sufficient consideration.
The upper bound on bank equity could in practice be enforced by imposing additional
wasteful regulation on banks that exceed a certain size.16 Another way to curb bank back-
loading and to guarantee bank future profits would be to tax bank lending at the constant
rate t0 and rebate tax revenues back to banks as a lump sum instantaneously. This differs
from a Ramsey taxation approach in that there is no government with an intertemporal
budget constraint. If the latter would be available, bank lending should be taxed in steady
state and the proceeds could be given to banks at date zero. Then it would be useful to
distort steady state bank lending even if the bank no-default condition takes the form of a
collateral constraint (when the bank cannot be excluded from lending to firms).
4.2 Numerical example
Consider a particular numerical example with parameter values given by a = q = 0.4,
b = 0.95, d = 0.08, and with initial bank equity a0 = 0.01. From figure 2 it can be seen
that the constrained-efficient allocation reaches its steady state immediately. Relative to
the competitive equilibrium the planner is able to roughly double date zero bank lending.
Welfare W0 increases by about 2 percent. Note that if we assume the economy is in an
unconstrained steady state prior to period zero, then bank equity dropped from 0.83 to 0.01.
But the difference in steady state welfare between competitive equilibrium and constrained
efficient equilibrium is not much higher. In fact, the planner can reduce the social cost of
the financial crisis by about 90 percent once we net out the exogenous drop in bank equity.
In the constrained-efficient allocation bank value at date zero is about 30 percent higher
compared to the competitive equilibrium. Worker value, which is the by far largest part
16For example, in many countries companies face stricter labor laws when their work force exceeds a certain
threshold. This sometimes affects the steady state size-distribution of companies.
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of total welfare, is by about 1 percent higher. From panel 2(e) we can see that the planner
constrains back-loading of equity distribution early on and starts paying dividends in t = 2
rather than t = 7. The planner supports a high level of bank debt by guaranteeing a bank
profit margin of 80 basis points. Bank future profits are thus at a constant high level while
they reach zero fast in competitive equilibrium.
5 Conclusion
This paper examines the role of regulation in reducing the social cost of banking crises.
In the model, banks have a special monitoring ability and will thus perform an economi-
cally valuable intermediation service. Bank creditors are wary of bank moral hazard such
that bank intermediation is constrained when bank equity is low (credit crunch). Banks
back-load the distribution of equity as dividends in an effort to alleviate the moral hazard
problem. In equilibrium, however, all banks accumulate equity and expand lending to bank
borrowers which reduces bank profitability. I show that bank back-loading is excessive and
harms bank incentives during a credit crunch in a way that reduces welfare. A planner
would prevent bank equity to grow beyond a certain threshold, effectively limiting the size
of banks. What makes the regulatory invention worthwhile is that banks lose access to
future profits when engaging in moral hazard. The planner can benefit from back-loading
distortionary rents. A numerical example illustrates that the planner may be able to reduce
the magnitude of the welfare cost of the banking crisis.
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6 Appendix
6.1 Discussion of related empirical literature
6.1.1 Entry of multinational banks
Entry of foreign banks can help to sustain the flow of credit to domestic firms even as domestic banks
face binding capital requirements. Peek and Rosengren (2000b) discuss this for Argentina, Brazil,
and Mexico, and argue that foreign banks also bring expertise to the domestic banking system. The
problem is that severe banking crises may lead to not just insufficient, but actually negative bank
net assets. If the country’s government lets foreign banks enter then competition for loans drives
down the value of struggling domestic banks to zero. Governments most likely will not allow all
struggling domestic banks to file bankruptcy at the same time. In fact, during the Brazilian banking
crisis, Brazil made it a condition for entering multinational banks to absorb struggling domestic
banks. But then the entering bank likely requires the government to restrict further entry: there
need to be sufficient rents from loans to be earned during the transition to earn back the cost of
absorbing negative equity of troubled domestic banks. Further, if domestic bank shareholders have
a stronger lobby than domestic workers, then a government is unlikely to allow foreign bank capital
as it will dilute domestically held equity.
6.1.2 Recapitalization
In the economy studied in this paper a recapitalization of banks at t = 0 is not feasible since workers
would default immediately. In practice, special regulatory circumstances may play a role in making
a timely recapitalization difficult. Swire (1992) documents how, for the US, regulatory powers have
been expanded significantly in the wake of banking crises. He argues that this might lead to a time
inconsistency problem. ’Superpowers’ granted to the FDIC include determining when a bank is
insolvent, and subordinating claims of insiders and outsiders to the deposit insurance fund’s claims.
In particular, informal agreements will not be honored by the FDIC, which acts as a receiver. Swire
(1992) argues that the specialness of bank, compared to nonfinancial corporate, insolvency law leads
to a different kind of bank run. Bank creditors as well as debtors will cease business relations with
the bank once it has low equity, as the point of insolvency is unclear due to FDIC discretion in that
matter. Hence, FDIC’s ex-post toughness on third parties may lead to excessive bank insolvencies
ex ante. In particular, recapitalization of banks may become more difficult: potential investors
would prefer to wait until after the bank went through an FDIC-orchestrated insolvency as this can
eliminate hidden liabilities.17 Hoshi and Kashyap (2010) describe how uncertainty over regulators’
17Coates and Scharfstein (2009) argue that attempts to recapitalize banks should involve forgiving debt
partially. The idea is to reduce the amount of new private equity needed to avoid a de facto nationalization
of banks, given that current regulation (in the US) prohibits individual non-financial investors to hold large
17
intentions slowed down recovery from the Japanese banking crisis of the 1990s.
6.1.3 Collusion or concentration
The constrained-efficient banking crisis resolution proposed above involves collusion (implemented
by a tax on bank lending) rather than concentration on the market for bank loans. However, both
are ways to recapitalize banks. Cetorelli and Gambera (2001) find that bank concentration is posi-
tively correlated with growth in fast growing, underdeveloped sectors, while negatively correlated
with growth in general. In particular, it may be beneficial if the banks serving an industry that
experiences a scarcity of investment have some market power. However, bank concentration differs
from collusion in that it may also affect otherwise perfectly competitive product markets on which
borrowers are active. Cartelization of firms as a result of bank concentration around 1900 has been
discussed by Simon (1998). For a recent example of how debt dependence may increase margins
on the product market see Chevalier (1995). Rajan and Zingales (2003) argue that incumbent banks
influence regulators to hinder financial reform, and thus keep bank industry concentrated, unless
pressures from trade and capital flow liberalization are strong.18
While bank concentration, as opposed to bank collusion, may be be interpreted as a possible
’third best’ response to a bank crisis, it cannot be cleanly separated from political economy issues.
For example, the 1923 Tokyo earthquake cost 38% of Japanese GDP at that time and arguably also
represented a large shock to bank net assets. In fact, the number of banks dropped from 2000 before
the disaster to about 65 after, while the fraction of total deposits held by the five largest banks
increased from 20.5% to 45.7%. In addition, banks became to head bond committees which may
have allowed them to exert power over borrowers that had access to direct finance. However, these
measures cannot be interpreted solely in the light of optimal regulation, as the Japanese government
at that time was also in need of a strong and willing banking sector to finance two wars (1937 war
against China, and the second world war).
6.1.4 Causes of financial crises
With respect to the 2007-2009 financial crisis, Acharya, Cooley, Richardson, and Walter (2010) argue
that large complex financial institution (LCFI) deliberately exposed themselves to severe tail risk,
thereby using their recently19 obtained status as ’too big to tail’ to realize and maximize the option
value on their holdings of securitized assets. Wilmarth (2008) argues that LCFI exposed themselves
to tail risk as an unintended by-product of their quest to maximize fee income from various financial
stakes in banks.
18In that sense regulators may be forced to renege on an earlier promise to grant rents, if international
financial integration arrives suddenly and unexpectedly. In that case banks will suddenly be severely under-
funded as the loss of future rents would lead to increased capital requirements.
19The repeal of the Glass-Steagall triggered remarkable concentration in the market for financial services
which ultimately led to only a handful of dominant ’universal banks’.
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services derived from an originate to distribute policy. For example, LCFI ended up warehousing a
substantial part of the asset-backed securities (ABS) they created, and also provided guarantees to
ease passing on these ABS to other investors. Both papers acknowledge special macroeconomic con-
ditions (especially, high international savings and loose monetary policy) leading to exceptionally
high demand for ABS by relatively ingenuous investors, as well as a regulatory failure to prescribe
adequate minimum equity requirements as essential amplifiers. However, while Wilmarth (2008)
believes that LCFI shared the misperception, for example, about the likelihood of a decline in house
prices with investors and regulators, Acharya et al. (2010) believe that LCFI intentionally manufac-
tured tail risk.
In the analysis provided in this paper it is assumed that the regulator thinks a future financial
crisis is impossible. Hence, the optimal regulation is derived without worrying about its effect on
the likelihood or severity of future crises. I think this is a good assumption since it is generally
observed that regulators did not make use of the tools they had to avert a disastrous economic
outcome: if most market participants do not see the crisis coming, regulators probably will not
either.20 Conversely, if LCFI are in fact guilty of deliberately bringing about a financial crisis, then
regulators are very likely guilty of gross negligence. Hence I do not think that regulators should
worry about being too lenient in providing assistance to LCFI during banking crises.21
6.2 Proofs
Proof of lemma 1. Part (i) is standard. To see part (ii) consider the following. If the bank defaults
in period t the worker can collect on the bank loan of size kt. If the bank does not monitor the
firm then the firm’s loan repayments decrease by qKat . (I assume that wages are senior to the loan
repayment.) The firm’s creditors bear this loss proportionally, such that the loss to the worker is
qKat
kt
Kt = qK
a 1
t kt. The bank can offer the worker to monitor the firm in exchange for K
a 1
t kt = Qtkt.
Note that the firm’s equilibrium demand for loans Kt is taken as given by the bank.
Proof of proposition 1. The bank problem is linear and the objective function is bounded above by
the present value of monopolist profits. As long as Rt+1 > 1b the bank retains dividends and
accumulates equity. When bank lending reaches a steady state at Kt = KFB bank future profits are
zero Pt = 0 and the bank no-default constraint reduces to at  qKat . Hence we have Kt < KFB
whenever at < qKaFB a¯0. Suppose the steady state is reached in period T then bank value VT = qK
a
FB.
20Former member of the Securities and Exchange Commission Paul S. Atkins has been quoted saying "Re-
member this crisis began in regulated entities . . . This happened right under our noses". See also Rajan (1996):
". . . in the course of performing their traditional activities, banks have acquired competencies that enable them
to perform a variety of other financial and non-financial activities that deregulation has opened up to them.
While some of these activities hold out considerable promise, bank executives are wisely approaching these
new activities with caution and restraint." On the other hand, potential moral hazard problems with an
originate-to-distribute policy are well understood, see for example Gorton and Pennacchi (1995).
21The proposal developed in Admati and Pfleiderer (2009) may be a way around that problem.
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Prior to period T bank value grows at rate 1b such that bank lending grows at rate g = b
  1a (possibly
at a lower, but strictly positive, rate in period T   1). But then T is finite.
Proof of proposition 2. The social planner faces a concave maximization problem with objective func-
tion bounded from above by 11 b (K
a
FB   dKFB). To verify concavity of the bank individual rationality
constraint note that it can be written as
at +Pt   qkat  0, (a  q)kat   (1  d)kt   bt +Pt  0.
The lefthand side of this equation is concave in kt since a  q  0 by assumption 1. Note that Pt
is concave in kt+s for all s = 1, 2, . . . . Note that the planner solves essentially a finite-dimensional
problem since a steady state is reached in a similar fashion as described in the proof of proposition
1. The Karush-Kuhn-Tucker theorem then yields the following Euler equation for the planner
b

aka 1t+1 + 1  d 
1
b

=
l0   1
l0
a(1  a)bka 1t+1 + b
yt+1
l0
qaka 1t+1 ,
where l0 > 1 is the Lagrange multiplier on the bank budget constraint at date zero and yt+1
is the Lagrange multiplier on the bank individual rationality constraint. In a steady state of the
constrained-efficient allocation, the righthand side is strictly positive even though yt+1 = 0 and
hence kt+1  K < KFB. For kt < K bank lending grows at rate g such that the planner steady state
is reached after some finitely many periods T. Since the planner improves upon the competitive
equilibrium we have k1jSB > k1jCE and hence T < T.
Proof of lemma 2. The constrained-efficient allocation features higher date zero value for each bank,
hence banks are better off. Further, we can use V(d) = a0 +P0 to write W0 as the present value
(using the subjective discount factor) of the economy’s output net of net investment. Since the
planner faces the same constraints as agents in competitive equilibrium, W0 is at least as high as in
competitive equilibrium. Due to the distortionary nature of the increase in bank value worker labor
income must increase if W0 increases. Hence workers are better off as well.
Proof of proposition 3. Evaluate the Euler equation in the proof of proposition in steady state such
that yt+1 = 0.
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Figure 2: The blue line shows the competitive equilibrium allocation and the green line shows the
constrained-efficient allocation.
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